Direkt zum Inhalt

Vortrag
Deterrence in EU Merger Policy

Jo Seldeslachts, Joseph Clougherty, Tomaso Duso, Miyu Lee


XXIX Jornadas de Economía Industrial
Barcelona, Spanien, 04.09.2014 - 05.09.2014


get_app Beitrag | PDF  0.98 MB

Abstract:
We estimate the deterrence effects of EU merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely involve robust deterrence in the European context, as they lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, merger-policy actions as a whole – as well as preventions, phase-2 remedies, and phase-1 withdrawals – do not appear to yield substantial deterrence effects. While we do not find that the 2004 merger reforms yield additional deterrence, we do find that the deterrence effects involved with phase-1 remedies work best in low-competition industries; i.e., in industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the Commission to define an industry as exhibiting a lack of competition.

Abstract

We estimate the deterrence effects of EU merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely involve robust deterrence in the European context, as they lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, merger-policy actions as a whole – as well as preventions, phase-2 remedies, and phase-1 withdrawals – do not appear to yield substantial deterrence effects. While we do not find that the 2004 merger reforms yield additional deterrence, we do find that the deterrence effects involved with phase-1 remedies work best in low-competition industries; i.e., in industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the Commission to define an industry as exhibiting a lack of competition.

Jo Seldeslachts

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte

Tomaso Duso

Abteilungsleiter in der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte


DIW-Link
Array

keyboard_arrow_up