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Why Do Emitters Trade Carbon Permits? Firm-Level Evidence from the European Emission Trading Scheme

The creation of the EU's Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has turned the right to emit CO2 into a positively priced intermediate good for the affected firms. Firms thus face the decision whether to source compliance with the EU ETS within their boundaries or to acquire it through the permit trade. However, a combination of internal abatement, free permit allocation and exibility to shift the use of ...

Market Driven Power Plant Investment Perspectives in Europe: Climate Policy and Technology Scenarios until 2050 in the Model EMELIE-ESY

EMELIE-ESY is a partial equilibrium model with focus on electricity markets. Private investors optimize their generation capacity investment and dispatch over the horizon 2010 to 2050. In the framework of the Energy Modeling Forum 28, we investigate how climate policy regimes affect market developments under different technology availabilities and climate policies on the European power markets. The ...

Targeted Pricing and Customer Data Sharing among Rivals

It is increasingly observable that competitors in different industries share customer data, which can be used for targeted pricing. We propose a modified Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such sharing and its ensuing welfare effects. We show that these incentives depend on the type of customer data and on consumer heterogeneity in the strength ...

Trade and the Environment: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity

This paper derives a new effect of trade liberalisation on the quality of the environment. We show that in the presence of heterogeneous firms the aggregate volume of emissions is influenced not only by the long-established scale effect, but also by a reallocation effect resulting from an increase in the relative size of more productive firms. We show how the relative importance of these effects, and ...

How Emission Certificate Allocations Distort Fossil Investments: The German Example

Despite political activities to foster a low-carbon energy transition, Germany currently sees a considerable number of new coal power plants being added to its power mix. There are several possible drivers for this "dash for coal", but it is widely accepted that windfall profits gained through free allocation of ETS certificates play an important role. Yet the quantification of allocation-related investment ...

Joint Customer Data Acquisition and Sharing among Rivals

It is increasingly observable that in different industries competitors jointly acquire and share customer data. We propose a modified Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such agreements and their welfare implications. In our model the incentives of firms for data acquisition and sharing depend on the willingness of consumers to switch brands. Firms ...

Refunding ETS-Proceeds to Spur the Diffusion of Renewable Energies: An Analysis Based on the Dynamic Oligopolistic Electricity Market Model EMELIE

We use a quantitative electricity market model to analyze the welfare effects of refunding a share of the emission trading proceeds to support renewable energy technologies that are subject to experience effects. We compare effects of supporting renewable energies under both perfect and oligopolistic competition with competitive fringe firms and emission trading regimes that achieve 70 and 80 percent ...

The Environmental and Economic Effects of European Emissions Trading in Germany

The Environmental and Economic Effects of European Emissions Trading

In this article, we analyse the effects of emissions trading in Europe, with special reference to Germany. We look at the value of the flexibility gained by trading compared to fixed quotas. The analysis is undertaken with a modified version of the GTAP-E model using the latest GTAP version 6 database. It is based on the national allocation plans (NAP) as submitted to and approved by the EU. We find ...

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...