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213 results, from 211
  • Diskussionspapiere 423 / 2004

    The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

    We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

    2004| Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
  • Externe referierte Aufsätze

    The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

    We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders' share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004), 8-9, S. 1067-1089 | Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
  • Externe referierte Aufsätze

    Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment

    This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms. Using information from the U.S. National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust ...

    In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 96 (2014), 2, S. 349-370 | Tomaso Duso, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Jo Seldeslachts
213 results, from 211
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