In the year 2000, the German government passed the most ambitious tax reform in postwar German history aiming at a significant tax relief for households. Drawing on data of the GSOEP, we analyze the distributional and fiscal effects of the tax reform. Our analysis employs microsimulation techniques. Furthermore, we estimate behavioral effects of the tax reform using a discrete choice labor supply model. ...
We analyze potential labor supply effects of a shift from the current German system of taxation of married couples to a system of limited real income splitting on the basis of econometric household labor supply model embedded in a tax-benefit model. Our simulation results show relatively small labor supply effects of a shift from the current system to one limited real income splitting system. In the ...
We analyze optimal income taxes with deductions for work-related or consumptive goods. We consider two cases. In the first case (called a complex tax system) the tax authorities can exactly distinguish between consumptive and work-related expenditures. In the second case (called a simple tax system) this distinction is not exact. Assuming additively separable utility functions, we show that work-related ...
Die Bundesregierung will die Abzugsmöglichkeiten für die Fahrtkosten zur Arbeit bei der Einkommensteuer einschränken. Mit den Mehreinnahmen soll die auf 2004 vorgezogene letzte Stufe der Steuerreform teilweise gegenfinanziert werden. Nach den jüngsten Beschlüssen der Regierungsfraktionen vom 23. September 2003 soll die Entfernungspauschale von 2004 an auf einheitlich 0,15 Euro je Entfernungskilometer ...
Seit langem werden Reformen des Ehegattensplittings bei der Einkommensteuerdiskutiert, zuletzt während der Koalitionsverhandlungen im Oktober 2002. Das DIW Berlin hat die Aufkommens- und Belastungswirkungen des gegenwärtigen Splittingverfahrens und von alternativen Formen der Ehegattenbesteuerung analysiert. Nach den Berechnungen würde eine Aufhebung des Splittingverfahrens, also ein Übergang zu einer ...
This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against ...
This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment ...